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Summary findings
Recent empirical work has shown that financial  Using the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998),
development is important for economic growth, since  Fisman and Love show that in countries with relatively
well-developed financial markets are more effective at  weak financial institutions, industries with greater
allocating capital to firms with high-value projects. This  dependence on trade credit financing (measured by the
raises the question of whether firms with high-return  ratio of accounts payable to total assets) grow faster than
projects in countries with poorly developed financial  industries that rely less on such credit. Furthermore,
institutions are able to draw on alternative sources of  consistent with the notion that young firms may not use
capital to offset the effects of deficient (formal) financial  trade credit, the authors show that most of the effect
intermediaries. Recent work suggests that implicit  they report comes from growth in preexisting firms
borrowing in the form of trade credit may provide one  rather than from an increase in the number of firms.
such source of funds.
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determinants of  access to finance. Copies of the  paper  are available free from the  World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,
Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Kari Labrie, room MC3-456, telephone 202-473-1001,  fax 202-522-1155, email
address klabrie@worldbank.org. Policy  Research  Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org.
The authors may be contacted at rf250@columbia.edu or ilove@worldbank.org.  October 2001.  (29 pages)
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development  issues.  An objective  of the  series  is to get the  findings  out quickly,  even  if the  presentations  are  less  than  fully  polished.  The
papers  carry  the names  of the authors  and should  be cited accordingly.  The findings,  interpretations,  and concIusions  expressed  in this
paper  are  entirely  those  of the authors.  They do not necessarily  represent  the view of the World  Bank,  its Executive  Directors,  or the
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In recent years, there has been increasing  interest in the economics  literature  in the role of
financial intermediaries in  promoting economic growth.  Recent papers have shown that
improved financial market  development is  associated with  growth, using  a  variety  of
methodologies  and datasets.1 One of the basic explanations  for this pattern is that the financial
sector serves to reallocate funds from those with an excess of capital, given their investment
opportunities,  to those with a shortage of funds (relative to opportunities). Thus, an economy
with well-developed  financial institutions  will be better able to allocate  resources  to projects  that
yield the highest  returns.
This allocative  role of financial institutions in promoting development  was the focus of
Rajan and Zingales (1998), who found that industrial sectors with a greater need for external
finance develop disproportionately  faster in countries with more developed financial markets.
This then begs the question of whether firms with high return projects in countries with poorly
developed financial  institutions are able to take steps to mitigate the effects of deficient  (formal)
financial intermediaries,  and if so, how.  One answer, implicit in Rajan and Zingales, is that
firms will be forced to rely more on internally generated funds. Recent work by Petersen and
Rajan (1997), suggests that  implicit borrowing from  suppliers may provide an  additional
possibility.  They found that, among small firms in the United States, those with less well-
established  banking  relationships  held significantly  higher levels of accounts payable. Similarly,
' Perhaps  the earliest  work  relating financial  market  development  to economic  growth is Cameron  (1967).  More
recent work  that examines  this relationship  using cross-country  data includes Levine  and King (1993)  and
Demirguc-Kunt  and Maksimovic  (1996). More sophisticated  approaches  have been utilized  by: Rajan  and Zingales
(1998),  who use within-country  variation  in industry  characteristics;  Bekaert  et al (2000), who make use of time-
series  variation  in looking  at the effect of financial  liberalization  on growth; and Rousseau and Wachtel (1998),  who
look at the links between  the intensity of financial intermediation  and economic  performance  in five  industrialized
countries.
3firms in MSA's  with a relative  scarcity of financial institutions carried higher levels of accounts
payable.  They suggest that their results imply that trade credit is used as a source of 'financing of
last resort'  by  very constrained  firms.  Nilsen  (1999) looks  at  this  issue  from  another  angle,
showing  that  during  monetary  contractions  small  firms,  which  are  likely  to  be  mor-  credit
constrained, react by borrowing more from their suppliers.
Now, even the most constrained of American firms face far less scarcity of fundl:ag from
formal institutions  than  companies  in many other  countries, where  stock markets  are  in their
infancy, and  formal lenders  are rare.  A natural extension of Petersen and Rajan's  reasoning is
that firms with  financing needs  in such countries will be more likely to fall back  on  ,upplier
financing in the form of trade credit as a means of funding growth.
Suppose that it is the case that trade credit is a substitute for institutional financing where
financial intermediaries are scarce, and further  that it is also true that firms in certain  industries
find  it inherently  easier  to  access trade  credit,  for  reasons  that will be  discussed  in  the next
section.  Then, this would imply a substitutability between  'trade credit suitability' and f.nancial
market  development.  That is, financial  market  development  should  matter disproportionately
more for firms that cannot make use of trade credit financing, or conversely, firms with access to
trade credit financing should face (relatively) fewer difficulties in countries with less developed
financial markets.
Using the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998), we test this hypothesis, using data
from a panel of 37 industries  and 44  countries.  Consistent with the basic  hypothesis outlined
above, we find that firms in industries with higher rates of accounts payable exhibit higher rates
of growth in countries  with relatively  weak  financial institutions. 2 We find these resulb;s  to be
2 We wish to emphasize  that our conclusions  on the substitutability  of trade credit and bank credit are based on the
within country  variation  in trade credit  usage across industries.  Thus, our results imply substitution  between these
4very strong, and  robust to  a  wide variety of  specifications.  However, since trade credit,
particularly in the absence of effective legal enforcement,  requires trust and reputation,  start-up
firrns may have more difficulty in benefiting from trade credit financing, as described above. 3
Consistent  with this hypothesis, we find that when growth is measured by the creation of new
establishments,  'credit intensive' industries  do not grow significantly  more rapidly in countries
with underdeveloped  capital markets.
The rest of the paper will be structured as follows: Section 2 will review the primary
theories of trade credit provision, and discuss why they imply an industry-specific  element to
trade credit access. In section 3, we discuss the data sets used in the analysis. Our basic results
are reported  in section  4; and we give  our conclusions  & discussion  in section  5.
1.  Theories  of Trade Credit Provision
There are numerous theories that provide explanations for the provision of credit by
suppliers. These theories often pertain to particular aspects of market structure  andlor product
characteristics,  and suggest  that certain industries  may have a greater ability  to utilize  trade credit
than others.  Since we will be using an industry-specific  measure of trade credit intensiveness,
we will begin by outlining  these basic theories  of trade credit provision,  with particular  reference
two sources of financing  at the micro level,  which is consistent  with previous findings  for US firms by Petersen  and
Rajan (1997), described  above. However,  since both sources  of financing  are likely to be positively  correlated  with
contract  enforcement,  legal or otherwise,  in a cross-country  regression  one might observe a positive correlation
between  trade credit  provision and formal  financial  intermediation,  which could be incorrectly  interpreted  as
representing  a complementarity  between  these two sources  of financing. This highlights  the importance  of utilizing
cross-industry  differences,  which allows us to better control for heterogeneity  across countries  in factors such as
legal enforcement.
3See,  for example,  McMillan  and Woodruff  (2000) for evidence  on the relationship  between  credit access  and firm
age.
5to industry  specificity.  Most  theories  of trade  credit provision  fall  into one  of the  following
categories:  1) comparative  advantage  in  liquidation,  2) price  discrimination  by  suppliers,  3)
warranty for product quality, and 4) customized products.
First,  several  authors  have  suggested  that  credit  provision  will  be  more  likely  in
circumstances  where  there  is easier  resale of the product being  sold, since this  will alhw  the
seller to seize and resell  its product if default occurs (see, for example, Mian and Smith (1992)
and  Frank  and  Maksimovic  (1998)).  Ease  of  resale  will  clearly  be  related  to  a  number  of
characteristics of these inputs: depreciation; firm-specificity; inventory stocks.  An implication of
this theory is that industries that utilize undifferentiated  raw materials, and that are required to
hold large amounts  of raw materials inventories  (relative to finished goods inventories)  will be
better able to obtain trade credit financing where necessary.4
The second theory involves price discrimination as a motive for trade credit provision by
suppliers.  Brennan,  Maksimovic  and  Zezhner  (1988) present  this argument,  claiming that  low
competition  among  suppliers in  an input market  may  create incentives to  discriminate  among
cash and credit customers. This would happen if, first, the demand  elasticity (or the reservation
price)  of credit customers  is lower  than that of cash customers,  and second, if there  is adverse
selection in the credit market.  In addition, trade credit could be used as a strategic instrument in
the oligopolistic  supplier market. Depending on the  degree of competition in the input market,
some industries may therefore  be more prone  to price discrimination by their suppliers. If some
industries  are 'naturally'  concentrated (e.g., because  of high fixed costs), and use of inputs  are
reasonably  similar within a given industry, access to trade credit  from upstream firms B  ill also
4This  hypothesis  is, in fact, bome out by our data: we find that, in a between industry  regression  of accounts
payable over assets on raw materials  inventories  over assets, the coefficient  on inventories  is positive  and
statistically  significant. Results available  from the authors.
6be similar. In support of this, an early study by Pryor (1972) finds that the rank ordering of
industrial  concentration  is highly correlated  among  12 developed  countries.
Some industries  may require trade credit as a guarantee  for product quality, as in Long,
Malitz and Ravid (1994). According  to their theory, the supplier will willingly extend credit to
allow the customer sufficient time to test the product. Similarly,  in Lee and Stowe (1993), and
Emery and Nayar (1998), the choice of trade credit terms offered  by the supplier  can serve as a
signal of product quality. Certainly, some products, for example  high-tech or newly developed
products,  need more quality assurance  for their inputs than others, such as commodities.
Another theory of credit provision comes from a model in a recent paper by Cunat
(2000). In this paper, supplier-customer  relationships  that have tailor made products, learning  by
doing, or other sources  of sunk costs, will generate  a surplus  that will increase with the length of
the relationship.  This will increase amount of credit that suppliers are willing  to provide,  since it
ties firms to particular suppliers, thereby increasing the scope for punishment of nonpayment.
Similar to the 'inspection'  discussion  outlined above, industries  with more complex input needs
will better fit this argument.
Finally, of particular relevance for this paper, Smith (1987) provides a theory of credit
provision that spans several categories,  using arguments related to product quality guarantees,
market power and sunk costs to generate a model of trade credit terms. She argues that credit
terms will be uniform within industries and differ across industries. The empirical support for
this model is presented in a recent paper by Ng, Smith and Smith (1999), who document wide
variation in credit terms across industries but little variation within industries. This evidence
lends some credibility to our assumption about the industry-specific  use of trade credit.  We
7provide  further  evidence  in the  Data  section below,  in  support  of our  claim that  there  is  an
industry-specific  element to trade credit intensiveness.
We have laid out, in this section, a number of theories of trade credit provision that may
have industry-specific  components to them.  It is worth noting that the purpose  of this paper is
not to assess which of these theories are primarily responsible for differences across indu:,tries in
reliance  on trade  credit.  Rather, for us, it is sufficient to note  that there  are many reasons  to
believe that such differences  should exist, to document that such differences do in fact exist in
our data, and to show that these differences are consistent and persist over time.
One  additional  concern  related  to  the  theory  of  credit  provision  is  that  many  of the
enforcement or information problems that may prevent the establishment of financial institutions
may potentially affect  the ability of firms to obtain trade credit  financing.  In particular,  where
rule of law is weak,  firms will not have legal recourse in the case of credit nonpayment.  This is
of concern, since we are claiming that trade credit exists as a substitute for bank financing where
the  latter is  scarce.  We will  argue, however,  that  even  though  weak  creditor protection  and
imperfect  information  will  affect  both  formal  intermediaries  and  trade  credit  provider,,  trade
creditors  may  mitigate  these  problems  better  than  formal  lenders  for  several  reasons  These
include advantages in 1) information acquisition, 2) the renegotiation/liquidation  process. and 3)
enforcement.
The first set of advantages  stems from the fact that suppliers are thought to have a cost
advantage over banks in acquisition of information about the financial health of the buyers. For
example,  Mian  and  Smith  (1992)  argue that  monitoring  of  credit-quality  can  occur  as a  by-
product of selling if a manufacturer's  sales representatives  regularly visit the borrower.  Biais
and Gollier (1993) assume that suppliers have different  signals about the customer's  probability
8of default  than do banks, and furthermore,  that the bank will extend  more credit if it observes  the
offering  of the trade credit by supplier.  Alternatively,  Smith  (1987) argues that the choice of the
trade credit terms made can be used as a screening device to elicit information  about buyers'
creditworthiness.
The  other  arguments follow  directly from  the  preceding discussion: because  of
advantages in the liquidation process, described above, the supplier would lend to a customer
even if the bank would not.  Finally, sunk costs and repeated interaction (as in the model by
Cunat (2000)  discussed  above)  may generate  surplus split among the supplier and the customer
and this surplus  will give supplier  an advantage  over the bank lending  in enforcement.
These  models taken together provide  theoretical  grounds  for arguing  that in the situations
when bank credit is unavailable,  trade credit could serve as a (weak) substitute. 5'6
III. Data
The data are primarily  drawn from Rajan and Zingales (1998) (referred to below as RZ)
and are described  in detail in their paper. A complete  list of the variables used in this paper with
the original sources is given in the Table 1. Our primary outcome  variable is the real growth in
valued added, estimated  for each of 37 industries  in 43 countries (UNCTAD,  1999). To estimate
5 These arguments  are also consistent  with  the cross-country  pattern  in rates of trade credit  provision, which is
uncorrelated  with financial  development. This is presumably  because  the counteracting  effects described  above
cancel  one another out in the aggregate. Results available  from the authors
6 Note that an alternative  theory of trade credit is that it exists  to decrease  transaction  costs of making  payments  on
delivery (Ferris, 1981).  According  to this explanation,  trade credit  usage by an industry  could  be interpreted  as the
level of transaction  costs specific for that industry  (for example, some industries  need more frequent  deliveries  of
inputs than others and therefore  transaction  costs will be higher). It is plausible to argue that financial  development
reduces  the transaction  costs of payments and therefore will benefit  firms (or industries)  with high transaction  costs
disproportionately.  This generates  the following  alternative  hypothesis  - that industries  with higher  reliance  on trade
credit are relatively  better off in countries  with more developed  financial  intermediaries.  Our results, reported  below,
strongly  reject this alternative  hypothesis.
9each industry's  dependence  on external finance, RZ use US firms from the Compustat database.
Similarly, we use Compustat  to calculate an industry-level "propensity  for trade  credit".  As in
RZ, we interpret the US data as 'industry representative'  - the actual use of trade credit will vary
across countries, and  the US  firms are likely to represent  the desired  (optimal)  level of trade
credit used by  firms in a given industry.  Using the US trade credit data implicitly assumes that
trade  credit usage by industries  in US is representative of trade  credit usage in other countries.
This is a strong assumption, borne  of necessity, as we do not have  adequate cross-countrv  data
on trade credit usage.  However, it is an assumption that has a strong theoretical rationale.  Jsing
each country's  individual  "dependence  on trade  credit"  would  be problematic,  for reasons  of
endogeneity:  one  of  our  basic  assumptions  is  that  trade  credit  usage  is  a  response  to  poor
financial development.  To capture the underlying 'technological  affinity' of an industry for trade
credit  dependence,  it is more  appropriate  to  look at  a  country  with  well-developed  markets,
where trade  credit  choices  are, in some sense, optimal.  The United  States, which  is excluded
from our regressions, provides  a potential 'exogenous'  measure of this.
We use  the  entire  universe  of  Compustat  firms,  which  is merged  with  CRSP  data to
obtain correct industry codes.  To be consistent  with previous  work, we take  1980-1989 as our
main  sample period,  and for  robustness  tests we use  data from  1970-  1998. To improve  data
quality we remove very small firms with sales, total assets or total liabilities less than $1 nmillion;
this reduces the sample size by about 10 percent.7
7In addition to the data quality issues,  this restriction  is justified by the reasoning that very small firms will ri )t be
representative of 'desired'  trade credit usage,  since it is harder for small firms to obtain trade credit. Also, firms that
are mainly equity financed (restriction  on total liabilities)  are not likely to be representative  users of trade crelit.  An
additional 3% of observations  were removed because the ratio of total liabilities to total assets was above I (likely
due to data problems and firms in distress).  The final dataset has about 3,200 firms with 21,000  observations.
10To obtain industry-level  measures of trade credit usage we use the ratio of accounts
payable to total assets (APAY),  the same  measure of the demand for credit used by Petersen  and
Rajan (1997). To obtain a value for each industry, we then take industry medians of the ratios
over all firm-years  in the relevant time period. This ratio gives the percentage  of total assets that
is financed by trade credit, and hence represents  an industry's ability  to rely on informal credit
rather then institutional  financing. As an alternative  measure, we also use the ratio of accounts
payable to total liabilities,  and obtain similar results. The correlation  between  these two measures
is 0.84 (see Table  3)*8  Exact definitions  are given  in Table 1.
To construct  measures of financial development  we use several components  available  in
the RZ dataset (the original source of financial development data is International Financial
Statistics). Our main measure is the ratio of total credit held by private (non-governmental)
organizations to  GDP (PRIV). We concentrate on debt, since the theories laid out in  the
preceding section focus on trade credit financing as an alternative to  funding by  financial
intermediaries,  rather than equity or bond market financing. Furthermore,  we focus on private
(rather than public) debt, since governmental  use of credit is often  thought to be contaminated  by
political considerations  that would not necessarily lead to optimal resource allocation. We do
also report regressions  utilizing other measures of financial development  such as stock market
development  (given by market capitalization  to GDP), and total (government  plus private) credit
use; we find that our results are not sensitive  to the inclusion/exclusion  of these other sources of
financing. Finally,  in the tests for endogeneity  of financial  development  we use legal origin and
accounting  standards  as instruments  (see Table 1 for definitions  and sources).
8 We also experimented  with other  industry-level  measures such as: accounts  receivable  (as a measure  for the
industry's need to provide  its customers  with  the credit);  inventories;  net credit  (difference  of accounts  payable and
accounts  receivable);  and sales to capital  ratio as a measure of capital intensity.  The main results on accounts
payable  were always  robust to the inclusion  of any of these additional  measures  (the results are available  on
request).
11Table 2 contains data on the median levels of accounts payable used by industries in the
US. The ratios for APAY/TA  (accounts payable  scaled by total assets) vary from 5% t3 about
15% with a mean of 9%, and the ratios of APAY/TL (scaled by total liabilities) vary frem  12%
to 27% with  a mean of  19%. Thus,  even within the US, trade  credit is a significant scurce  of
financing.  By comparison, the mean of short-term debt to assets is 3.4% and the mean of long-
term debt to assets is 16% (scaled by total liabilities  the ratios are 7% and 33% respectively). 9
The industries with  the lowest usage  of trade  credit  are: drugs; leather;  pottery; and  pulp and
paper;  and the industries  with the highest usage  are: spinning  (a slight  outlier and  a relatively
small  category);  motor  vehicles;  and  petroleum  refineries.  These  patterns  fit,  at  least
anecdotally, with the theories laid out in the previous section.  For example, petroleum refineries
are raw material  intensive, and utilize relatively undifferentiated  inputs.  At the other extreme,
the pharmaceutical industry often makes use of product specific inputs that are difficult to resell.
We recognize, however, that it is always possible to come up with post hoc explanations for such
patterns  in the data.  Hence, we prefer to focus on the stability of trade credit ratios across time,
by industry,  as an indication  of the  industry specificity of trade  credit. If  our claim that trade
credit  is  a meaningful  and  stable  industry  characteristic  is  correct,  it should  to  be persistent
across time periods.
Table 3 shows correlations of industry-level measures of trade credit use and dependence
on external financing across different time periods. Our main variable (APAY) is measured over
the 1980's  to match the timing of the industry growth data. Indeed,  the correlation  for APAY
between  the  1980's  and  1990's  is  0.83  and  between  the  1970's  and  1980's  it is  0 79.  By
9  Cunat  (2000)  reports  that  US  is on the lowx  side  in  the cross-country  comparison  of trade  credit  usage,  so fior  most
other  countries  trade  credit  is even  more  important  as a source  of financing.
12comparison,  the correlation  for the RZ measure of dependence  on external  financing  between  the
1970's and 1980's is 0.63 (no data on the 1990's was  reported by RZ).10
IV. Results
IV.1. Main results
Our main hypothesis is that industries  that are more "dependent" on trade credit will be
relatively  better off in countries  with less developed  institutional  finance.
The regression  implied  by this conjecture  is the following:
GROWTH 0 j = ai +  ±c  + P*PRIVc*APAYi  +  ci  (1)
where c denotes country, i denotes industry, and we expect a negative sign on the interaction
term PRIV*APAY. We use  industry and country dummies (as and E,) to  control for  all
unobservable sources of value added growth specific to each country and each industry, and
there is thus no need for PRIV and APAY to enter the regression on their own. The main results
are given in Table 4. Model I reproduces the main result from the RZ paper; they find that
industries  that are more dependent on external financing grow more rapidly in countries with
more developed  financial  markets (a positive coefficient  on the interaction  term). Throughout  the
paper we will use the term RZ interaction  to stand for the main interaction  used in the RZ study,
which  is  the  product of  the  industry's  dependence on  external financing and  financial
development  (measured  as the sum of domestic  credit and market capitalization).  Model II shows
10  Another  interesting  observation,  also consistent  with  the idea of industry-specific  'propensity for  trade credit', is
that in regressions  of trade credit intensiveness  on firm size, about five times more variation  is explained  by between
industry  variation  than within industry  variation. So, to the extent that size is a predictor  of credit access,  most of
this seems to result from some industries  having 'naturally' larger firms,  and also being naturally  suited to credit
access.
13our main  finding - the negative coefficient  on  the interaction  of the industry-level measure  of
accounts  payable  scaled  by  total  assets  (APAY)  and  the  country-level  measure  of  (0rivate)
financial intermediary development (PRIV)."1 This coefficient  is significant at  1% (all errors in
this paper are adjusted for heteroskedasticity),  consistent with our main hypothesis that in lustries
that  are  more  dependent  on  trade  credit  have  a  relative  advantage  in  countries  with  less
developed financial intermediaries.  The magnitude of the effect of our main interaction en value
added growth may be thought of in the following terms: consider a move from the country at the
75th percentile of private  financial intermediary development (e.g., Korea) to the country at the
25th percentile (e.g., Egypt).  According to our calculations,  this will widen  the gap in growth
rates between the industries at the 25th (Printing and Publishing) and 75th (Plastics) percentiles
of trade credit intensity by 1.3 percent.  This difference in differences is virtually identical to the
effect  of  the  RZ  interaction.  As  noted  in  RZ,  this  order  of  magnitude  is  similar  to  other
explanatory variables used in the growth regressions  such as investment's  share of GDP and per
capita income.
Model III shows that this finding is robust to exclusion of the fraction of industr.'s  share
in total manufacturing,  which is used as a control variable in the rest of the regressions.  Model
TV shows  that including  our interaction together  with the RZ interaction  leaves both measures
significant at  1%, suggesting that the trade  credit channel provides  an effect  on growth that is
independent of the external financing channel.
Throughout  the paper  we  refer  to  this  product  of APAY/TA  and  PRIV  as "our  main  interaction".
14IV.2. Composition of capital markets
In Table 5 we check for the sensitivity of the results to alternative  measures  of financial
development  to explore  which of the aspects  of financial  development  are stronger  substitutes  for
trade credit. Model I uses total domestic credit to GDP, rather than private domestic credit to
GDP as used in our main measure PRIV. The result is still significant at the 1% level, and
comparable  in magnitude.  Next, we add RZ's measure of market capitalization  to see whether
stock market development or financial intermediary  development is a stronger substitute for
trade credit. The interaction with market capitalization  is significant,  but only at the 10% level;
in contrast,  measures based on domestic credit or private domestic credit are always significant
at 1%. Moreover,  the coefficient on market capitalization  is less than a quarter of that of private
credit, and also has a smaller standard deviation.  These results are consistent  with our hypothesis
that it is financial  intermediaries  rather than stock markets that primarily  act as close substitutes
for trade credit.
A few additional  regressions  highlight the robustness  of our primary findings. When we
include both total domestic credit and private credit in the same regression (Model IV), the
significance of domestic credit disappears.  This is effectively capturing the fact that, after
controlling  for the presence of private credit, additional domestic credit (i.e., credit to public
organizations)  is irrelevant for explaining our results. Finally, we test whether our main result
could be caused  by a simple wealth effect, rather than financial institutions' development,  by
including  APAY interacted with log GDP per capita. Model VI shows that this is not the case:
15the  interaction  of  APAY  with  GDP  is  not  significant,  while  our  main  interaction  Is still
significant at the 1% level.
IV.3. Growth  in average  firm size versus growth  in number  of firms.
In Table 6 we decompose growth in value added into growth in the total number of firms
in the industry and growth in the average size of individual firms. This addresses the question of
whether trade  credit is a more important source of growth for new firms (growth in the rumber
of firms) or for more mature  firms. In the regression with the growth in the number of firms as
the dependent variable the main interaction is not significant at conventional levels. By contrast,
in the regression with the growth in the average size as the dependent variable, the coefficient on
our main interaction  is significant at 1% (models III and IV). Furthermore,  the RZ interaction  is
no longer significant  at conventional  levels if our main  interaction  is also  included (model IV,
the RZ interaction is significant at 14% in this model). This is consistent with our hypothesis that
for young firms, which have not yet had a chance to establish reputations for credit worthiness,
trade  credit  is  a  less  accessible  source  of  substitute  financing  than  it  is  for  mature  firms.
Furthermore, for mature firms trade credit financing appears to be a more important determinant
of growth than the dependence  on external financing captured by the RZ interaction. 1 2
12 RZ also report  that in the regression  with the number  of firms, their effect  is estimated  more precisely:  their
interaction  is significant  at 5% in the number  regression  and only 10% in the average size regression.  This finding
could be interpreted  as suggesting  that the RZ measure of extemal financing  actually  picks up the fact that young
firms,  which are likely to be in rapidly growing  industries,  are more dependent  on extemal  financing  than firms in
mature industries.
16IV.4. Robustness
Table 7 explores the robustness of our results to alternative definitions of trade credit
dependence  and alternative  measures  of growth. In models  I and II we use APAY/TL  (accounts
payable scaled by total liabilities) as a measure of trade credit dependence,  and find that this
alternative  definition  does not affect our results. Models  III and IV use APAY/TA  measured  over
the 1970's; the result is slightly less significant - only at 4%, similarly, the RZ interaction is
significant only at  4% when measured over the  1970's (this  could be  accounted for by
attenuation  bias due to lower quality data). Model V uses APAY/TA  measured over the 1990's
and finds it to be significant at 1%. Thus, our main result is not sensitive to a different scaling
factor or different  time horizons.
Next, we  address the  question of  reverse causality in  financial development. The
argument  here is that if the country's economy contains more industries  that rely more on trade
credit, there will be less need for formal intermediaries  to develop. This is a weak argument,
since first, the presence of trade credit still leaves a lot of room for formal credit markets to
develop. Second,  trade credit seems to be a second  best option,  as firms that have access  to bank
credit prefer it to the use of trade credit (see Petersen  and Rajan (1997)). Nevertheless,  following
RZ, we run our main regression using instrumental variables with legal origin dummies as
instruments for financial development. In  model VI we  find that our  main result is  still
significant,  although  now only at 6% level.  Finally, we use accounting  standards  as a proxy for
financial  intermediary  development  and still find a negative  relationship  (model VII). This could
be interpreted  as evidence in support of information-based  theories of trade credit advantages,
since with poor accounting  standards, less information  is available for financial intermediaries,
17thereby  tilting  the  balance  in  favor  of supplier  financing.  However,  this  result  is  somewhat
weaker than our other results: the significance is only 10%, though this is partially a reflection of
the decline in sample size (about 20%).
Finally,  in Table  8 we  make sure that our results  are not driven by a  small number of
influential observations. The distribution of the main dependent variable, the growth in real value
added,  has  very  long  tails: while  the  10th  and  90th percentiles  of growth are -5%  and  +12%
respectively (with mean and median of about 3%) the extreme observations go as far as -50%  to
+100% (observations above 100% were replaced with missing by RZ). All regressions in Table 8
(except model IV) exclude the  1% of observations on each side of the distribution for growth in
value  added  (in  effect  all  observations  below  -30%  and  above  +27%  are  excluded).  This
exclusion  does not affect  significance of our main  interaction,  which  is still significant at  1%.
However,  the RZ interaction  is more  sensitive  to influential  observations  and  its significance
drops to 5% in the regression by  itself (model I) and  10% if APAY is added (model III). The
magnitude  of the effect  on the growth in value  added drops  from about 1% to 0.52%  for our
main interaction and 0.38% for the RZ interaction. However, the explanatory power rises to 0.36
from 0.3  suggesting that these outlying  observations  created considerable  noise in the original
estimates. Finally, model IV excludes industry with ISIC code 3211 (Spinning), which appears to
be an outlier on the APAY/TA  measure  and model V excludes  1% outliers and Spinning.  The
significance of our main result is not affected by these exclusions.'3
13In additional  results,  not reported,  we explored  the sensitivity  to exclusion  of specific  countries.  For example, we
excluded two countries  with the highest level of PRIV (Singapore  and Japan),  and the main interaction  was s-ill
significant  at 1%  (not reported).
18V. Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that firms in countries with less developed financial
markets appear to substitute  informal credit provided  by their suppliers  to finance growth.  Using
the methodology  pioneered by Rajan and Zingales (1998),  we find that industries  that are more
dependent  on trade credit financing  grow relatively  more rapidly  in countries  with less developed
financial intermediaries.  The result is robust to the addition of various industry-level  measures,
alternative  financial development  measures, and exclusion  of influential observations.  We also
find that trade credit usage affects growth in the average size of firms rather than the growth in
the number of firms. This is consistent with 'reputation-based' theories of trade credit, which
argue  that new firms will have greater difficulties  in obtaining  trade credit.
This paper uncovers an important  and significant  role for trade credit as a source of firm
financing and growth, thus calling into question claims that trade credit exists only to reduce
transaction  costs. This certainly does not detract from the importance  of financial development
as an engine of growth: as we have emphasized,  our argument is driven by the assumption  that
firms view trade credit as a second-best alternative  to bank financing. Furthermore,  our results
on new firm growth imply that, in some sense, trade credit is less 'democratic' than bank
financing in promoting growth, which may raise concerns  about fostering industry competition
and may also have distributional  implications. Still, our work highlights  the fact that in the face
of  adverse circumstances, firms  are  effective in  finding substitutes to  poorly  developed
institutions. The substitution  of trade credit for formal bank financing is just one example, and
we leave similar  analyses  along  other dimensions  as possibilities  for future work.
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21Table  1. List  of variable  abbreviations,  definitions  and  sources.
Abbreviation Description
I. Variables  from Rajan and Zingales:
1) Industry-level  variables,  original  source ComDustat:
EXTFIN  Dependence  on external  financing,  industry-level  median  of the  ratio  of  capital  ependitures  minus  cash
flow  over  capital  expenditures  (the  numerator  and  denominator  are  summed  over  all years  for each  firm
before  dividing).  This  variable  measures  the portion  of capital  expenditures  not  financed  by internally
generated  cash.  Cash  flow is  defined  as the  sum  of  funds  from  operations,  decreases  in inve!ntories,
decreases  in receivables,  and  increases  in payables.  This  variable  is measured  over  1980-1989  includes
all firms,  EXTFIN  70's  is measured  over  1970-1980.
2) Country-Industry  level variables,  original  source United Nations  Statistics:
Industry  growh Main  measure  is growh  in value  added;  it is  annual  compounded  growth  rate  in real  value  acded
estimated  for  the period  1980-1990  for each  ISIC  industry  in each  country.  Growth  in number  equals  to
the diference  in  the log  of ending  period  firm  number  less  the log  of firm  number  in the  begirning  of
period.  Growth  in average  size  equals  the  difference  in logs  of  the average  size,  which  is  defined  as  total
value  added  in the  industry  divided  over  the  number  of frms  in the  industry.
Fraction  Fraction  of  the industry's  value  added  in  total  manufacturing  value  added  for 1980.
3) Country-level  variables:
Domestic  Ratio  of  domestic  credit  held  by  monetary  authorities  and  depositary  institutions  (excluding  interbank
credit  deposits)  scaled  by GDP  for 1980.  Original  source  is International  Financial  Statistics  (IFS).
Private credit  Ratio  of  private  domestic  credit  held  by  monetary  authorities  and  depositary  institutions  (excluding
interbank  deposit)  scaled  by  GDP  for 1980.  Original  source  is  International  Financial  Statist  cs (IFS).
Market  cap.  Ratio  of  stock  market  capitalization  to GDP  in 1980.  IFS.
Log GDP PC  Log  of  GDP  per  capita  in US dollars  in 1980.  IFS
Legal  origin  Dummies  for English,  French,  German  or Scandinavian  origin  of  the legal  system.  La Porta  et  al. (1996)
Accounting  Amount  of disclosure  of companies's  annual  reports  in each  countries.  La Porta  et al.(1996'
Standards
11.  Additional  variables  constructed  from Compustat:
APAY,  Accounts  payable  scaled  by  total  assets,  industry  medians  of frim-level  measures.  Main  variable  is
APAY/TA  measured  over  1980-1989,  additional  variables  are  measured  over  1970-1979  and  1990-1938.
APAY/TL  Accounts  payable  scaled  by  total  liabilities,  industry  medians  of  frim-level  measures  over  1'980-1989.
S/K  Sales  scaled  by capital  (ppent  - property  plant  and  equipment  net  of  depreciation)Table 2. Trade credit use by industry
Median levels  of Accounts Payable  by industry,  APAY/TA  is scaled by total assets APAY/TL  is scaled
by total liabilities.  Sources Compustat  and CRSP  for industry  codes.
ISIC code Description  APAY/TA  1980's  APAY/TA  1990's  APAY/TL 1980's
311  Food products  11.4%  8.7%  21.2%
313  Beverages  9.1%  6.4%  17.4%
314  Tobacco  6.8%  4.8%  12.6%
321  Textile  10.1%  7.6%  22.4%
3211  Spinning  14.9%  15.1%  29.3%
322  Apparel  11.2%  11.5%  24.6%
323  Leather  5.8%  7.9%  14.3%
324  Footwear  9.3%  7.4%  23.4%
331  Wood Products  8.9%  6.5%  17.8%
332  Furniture  9.2%  8.3%  20.6%
341  Paper and Products  8.2%  7.1%  17.7%
3411  Pulp, paper  6.4%  5.8%  13.2%
342  Printing and Publishing  7.6%  7.1%  16.1%
3511  Basic chemicals  excl. Fertil.  8.3%  7.1%  17.2%
3513  Synthetic resins  8.8%  8.4%  18.0%
352  Other Chemicals  9.9%  9.0%  22.1%
3522  Drugs  5.6%  5.0%  15.9%
353  Petroleum refineries  11.8%  10.2%  21.3%
354  Petroleum  and coal products  9.5%  8.9%  21.5%
355  Rubber products  9.0%  8.0%  20.0%
356  Plastic  products  9.9%  10.2%  20.1%
361  Pottery  6.7%  5.7%  15.3%
362  Glass  9.3%  8.9%  17.9%
369  Non metal products  6.5%  6.8%  14.2%
371  Iron  and Steel  9.5%  9.9%  18.0%
372  Non-ferrous  metal  7.9%  7.3%  18.3%
381  Metal products  8.7%  8.7%  19.1%
382  Machinery  8.7%  9.1%  18.4%
3825  Office, computing  8.5%  9.5%  22.6%
383  Electric  machinery  8.3%  9.3%  19.4%
3832  Radio  7.7%  7.9%  19.3%
384  Transportation  equipment  10.6%  9.9%  21.1%
3841  Ship  10.2%  8.1%  17.8%
3843  Motor veichle  11.5%  11.5%  21.4%
385  Professional  goods  7.2%  6.5%  18.0%
390  Other ind.  8.9%  8.4%  19.3%
Mean  8.9%  8.3%  19.1%
Median  8.9%  8.2%  18.7%
Standard  deviation  1.9%  2.0%  3.3%Table 3. Correlations  of industry-level  measures.
Correlations  of industry-level  medians.  See  Table  1  for variable  definition  and  sources.  If not  specified  implicitly,  the
variable  is measured  over  1980's.  All correlations  are  based  on 36 observations,  except  EXTFIN  measured  over  70's
which  has  only  35 observations.  P-values  are  in parenthesis  (0 stands  for lower  then  0.01),  * dentotes  significance  at 5%.
APAY/TA  70's  APAY/TA  80's  APAY/TA  90's  APAY/TL  EXTFIN  EXTFIN  70's
APAY/TA  80's  0.79*
(0)
APAY/TA  90's  0.64*  0.83*
(0)  (0)
APAY/TL  0.71*  0.84*  0.78*
(0)  (0)  (0)
EXTFIN  0.11  -0.13  -0.01  0.07
(0.51)  (0.46)  (0.93)  (0.66)
EXTFIN  70's  0.09  0.02  0.15  0.08  0.63*
(0.59)  (0.89)  (0.37)  (0.62)  (0)
S/K  0.20  0.04  0.15  0.28  -0.16  -0.06
(0.25)  (0.79)  (0.37)  (0.09)  (0.34)  (0.71)Table 4. Accounts  Payable  and Industry  Growth
Dependent variable is real  growth in value added.  Fraction is fraction of industry Value Added in total
manufacturing in  1980, RZ Interaciton is interaction of industry's dependence on external financing with
Financial development, PRIV is Financial Intermediary development  in 1980 (the ratio of total credit held by
private (non-governmental)  organizations  to GDP) , APAY/TA  is industry's  dependence on trade credit measured
by Accounts  Payable  over Total assets. All variables are from RZ except for APAY/TA which is from Compustat
1980-1989.  All models include country and industry dummes. Standard errors appear in parentheses, and are
adjusted  for heteroskedasticity.  Significance  levels *'",  **  and *  correspond  to 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
1  2  3  4
Fraction  -0.91  -0.88  -0.95
(0.246)  (0.247)  (0.248)
RZ Interaction  0.069  0.064
(0.023)  (0.022)
Interaction  APAY/TA and
PRIV  -2.01  -1.64  -1.79
(0.597)  (0.604)  (0.568)
N  1217  1217  1217  1217
R2  0.29  0.29  0.27  0.30Table 5. Composition of Capital Markets and GDP
Dependent variable is real growth in value added.  Fraction is fraction of industry Value Added in
total manufacturing in 1980, APAY/TA is industry's dependence on trade credit measured by
Accounts Payable over Total assets.  Domestic credit is the ratio of total credit to GDP in 1980;
PRIV is Financial Intermediary development in 1980 (the ratio of total credit held by private (non-
governmental) organizations to GDP); Market cap is the ratio of stock market capitalization to
GDP in 1980; FD RZ is the financial development measure used by RZ (the sum of domest:.c
credit and market capitalization). All variables are from RZ except for APAY/TA which is fTrom
Compustat 1980-1989. All models include country and industry dummes. Standard errors appear
in parentheses, and are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Significance levels ***,  ** and *
correspond to 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
1  2  3  4  5  6i
Fraction  -0.84  -0.85  -0.89  -0.89  -0.86  -0.88
(0.25)  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.25) . (0.25)
Interaction  of
APAY/TA  with:
Domestic credit  -1.44  -1.44  -0.21
(0.53)  (0.52)  (0.57)
PRIV  -2.02  -1.84  -1.97
(0.60)  (0.66)  (0.60) ..
Market Cap.  -0.48  -0.48  -0.48
(0.27)  (0.25)  (0.25)
FD
FD RZ  -0.78
(0.29)
Log GDP PC  -0.01
(0.05;1
N  1217  1192  1192  1192  1217  121'
R2  0.29  0.29  0.29  0.29  0.28  0.29Table 6. Growth in Number and Size
Dependent  variable  is growth  in number  of establishments  in  models  1  and 2 and growth  in average  size
of establishments  in models  3 and  4. Fraction  is fraction  of industry  Value  Added  in total  manufacturing  in
1980, APAY/TA  is industry's  dependence  on trade  credit  measured  by Accounts  Payable  over  Total
assets.  PRIV  is Financial  Intermediary  development  in 1980  (ratio  of total  credit  held  by private  (non-
govermmental)  organizations  to GDP  )  RZ Interaction  is interaciton  of industry's  dependence  on  external
financing  with  Financial  development.  All models  include  country  and  industry  dummes.  Standard  errors
appear  in  parentheses,  and  are adjusted  for heteroskedasticity.  Significance  levels  ***, ** and * correspond
to 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Growth  in Number  of  Growth  in Average  Size  of
Dependent  Variable:  Establishments  Establishments
1  2  3  4
Fraction  -0.19  -0.23  -0.77  -0.81
(0.140)  (0.150)  (0.330)  (0.330)
Interaction  of
APAY/TA  and  PRIV  -0.47  -0.41  -1.97  -1.92
(0.380)  (0.370)  (0.580)  (0.580)
RZ interaction  0.028  0.026
(0.012)  (0.018)
N  1073  1073  1047  1047
R2  0.45  0.45  0.43  0.43Table 7. Robustness I - Alternative Measures
Dependent variable is real growth in value added.  Fraction is fraction of industry Value Added in
total manufacturing in 1980, RZ Interaciton is interaciton of industry's dependence on extemal
financing with Financial development, PRIV is Financial Intermediary development in 1980 (ratio c,f
total credit held by private (non-governmental) organizations to GDP). Models 1 and 21 use
APAY/TL (accounts payable scaled by total liabilities) measured over 1980's; models 3 and 4 use
APAY/TA (accounts payable scaled by total assets) and RZ interaction measured over 1970's; modJel
5 uses APAY/TA measured over 1990's; model 6 is estimated by instrumental variables with legal
origin used as instruments for PRIV -financial intermediary development. Model 7 is interaction of
APAY/TA with accounting standards. All models include country and industry dummnes.  Standard
errors appear in parentheses, and are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Significance levels ***,  **  anc  *
correspond to 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
1  2  3  4
Fraction  -0.86  -0.94  -0.84  -0.90
(0.25)  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.25)
Interaction
APAYand PRIV  -0.86  -0.89  -1.31  -1.49
(0.30)  (0.30)  (0.48)  (0.50)
RZ interaction  0.07  0.12
(0.02)  (0.05)
N  1217  1217  1217  1179
R2  0.29  0.3  0.28  0.28
5  6  7
Fraction  -0.83  -0.85  -0.61
(0.24)  (0.25)  (0.21)
Interaction
APAYand PRIV  -1.53  -0.94  -0.013
(0.58)  (0.54)  (0.01)
RZ interaction
N  1217  1207  1067
R2  0.29  0.29  0.34Table 8. Robustness II -Excluding Outliers
Dependent variable is real growth in value added.  Fraction is fraction of industry Value Added in
total manufacturing in 1980, RZ Interaciton is interaciton of industry's dependence on external
financing with Financial development,  PRIV is Financial Intermediary development in 1980 (ratio
of total credit held by private (non-governmental)  organizations to GDP), APAY/TA is industry's
dependence on trade credit measured by Accounts Payable over Total assets. All variables are from
RZ except for APAY/TA which is from Compustat 1980-1989.  Models 1-3 exclude 1  % of
obseravtions on each side for the dependent variable, model 4 excludes industry 3211 (Spinning),
and model 5 excludes industry 3211 in addition to 1% outlier on each side. All models include
country and industry dummes. Standard errors appear in parentheses, and are adjusted for
heteroskedasticity.  Significance  levels  ***,  ** and  * correspond  to  1%, 5% and  10% respectively.
.1  2  3  4  5
Fraction  -0.43  -0.43  -0.46  -0.92  -0.43
(0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.27)  (0.12)
Interaction of
APAY/TA and PRIV  -0.86  -1.22  -2.19  -1.36
(0.26)  (0.40)  (0.77)  (0.51)
RZ Interaction  0.029  0.025
(0.013)  (0.013)
N  1202  1202  1202  1187  1172
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